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SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW

THE HEALTH CARE WORKFORCE: HOW TO UNDERSTAND
ACCOMMODATIONS

LESLIE FRANCIS* AND ANITA SILVERS**
I. INTRODUCTION
The celebrations of the twenty-fifth birthday of the Americans with
Disabilities Act (ADA) have sounded the somber note that people with
disabilities continue to be under-employed and unemployed in disproportionate
numbers. In his speech at the reception honoring the ADA, President Obama
remarked: “But we all know too many people with disabilities are still
unemployed -- even though they can work, even though they want to work,
even though they have so much to contribute.” 1
Representing as it does nearly twenty percent of gross domestic product
(GDP), 2 health care has the potential to contribute either to the creation or to
the alleviation of apparently endemic employment problems for people with
disabilities. Third party payers pay for so much of health care that arguably
any costs associated with workplace accommodations—if indeed there are
any—are widely shared. And one way in which health care contributes to the
general society is to return to citizens who have suffered illness or injury the
capacity to work. So if any employers should understand accommodating
individuals with disabilities who can work and want to work, the health care
industry might seem to be the place.
* Leslie P. Francis is Distinguished Professor of Philosophy, Distinguished Alfred C. Emery
Professor of Law, and Director of the Center for Biomedical Sciences and Law at the University
of Utah. Research for this article was supported by the Excellence in Research and Teaching fund
of the S.J. Quinney College of Law. We are grateful for research assistance from Anikka Hoidal,
2L, S.J. Quinney College of Law.
** Anita Silvers, Ph.D., is Professor and Chair of Philosophy at San Francisco State University.
She has been awarded the American Philosophical Association Quinn Prize for service to
philosophy and philosophers and the Phi Beta Kappa Society Lebowitz Prize for philosophical
achievement. She serves as a community representative on the San Francisco General Hospital
Ethics Committee.
1. Press Release, The White House, Office of the Press Secretary, Remarks by the
President on the Americans With Disabilities Act (July 20, 2015), https://www.whitehouse.gov/
the-press-office/2015/07/20/remarks-president-americans-disabilities-act.
2. Ctrs. for Medicare & Medicaid Servs., National Health Expenditure Data Historical,
CMS (Oct. 16, 2015), https://www.cms.gov/research-statistics-data-and-systems/statistics-trendsand-reports/nationalhealthexpenddata/nationalhealthaccountshistorical.html.
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Yet employment in health care for people with disabilities can appear to
pose intractable problems not found elsewhere in the workforce. How can a
paraplegic—much less a quadriplegic—physician effectively conduct patients’
physical examinations? How can a deaf psychologist interact with patients
appropriately, unless she is delivering services as a sign language user to
another member of the Deaf community? How can a visually impaired nurse
manage the complexities of intensive care unit (ICU) care? How can a person
with chronic fatigue syndrome who requires flexible scheduling often with
little notice, or a person with diabetes who requires frequent breaks for testing
blood sugar, provide the time-sensitive staffing for respiratory care service?
And how can a person with intellectual disabilities function in the complex
world of health care, except for very limited tasks such as laundry delivery or
waste removal? These and many other questions suggest that health care might
not be a likely venue to address the myriad employment issues facing people
with disabilities today.
To be sure, there are some common answers to these questions. The
assumptions on which they rest reflect stereotypes about people with
disabilities and how their capabilities may be limited. The assumptions also
reflect a failure of imagination about readily available alternative ways of
accommodating tasks that are familiar to people with disabilities and thus
relegate people with disabilities only to the tasks that they can perform in
standard fashion. They fail to appreciate other skills that people with
disabilities may bring to health care, such as the expansive understanding that
people with disabilities working in rehabilitative medicine can provide to
others based on their own experience with making use of these services. These
are all important points, but they will not be our concern in this article, for
employment success of people with disabilities will continue to be marginal at
best without a fuller and deeper account of what is meant by “reasonable
accommodations” 3 within the context of the ADA as a civil rights statute.
In this article, we deploy an approach to reasonable accommodations that
challenges the depiction of health care as a problematic target to expand
employment opportunities of people with disabilities. After an explanation of
what we mean by reasonable accommodations as a civil right, we turn to
themes in the case law involving requests for accommodations by health care
workers. In some cases, courts have engaged in a careful assessment of
employers’ claims about essential job responsibilities—assessments that might
be undertaken more widely by health care employers. On the other hand,
where employers raise concerns about patient safety or about supposedly
neutral on-the-job rules, courts may be too likely to defer. Further, courts have
had a history of giving problematic deference to medical professionals’

3. 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(o) (2015).
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judgments about training programs and assessment of qualifications that
adversely affect the pipeline of potentially qualified health care workers. We
conclude by suggesting that our analysis has broader implications for how the
health care profession may comply with the ADA in addressing employment of
people with disabilities.
II. REASONABLE ACCOMMODATIONS
The ADA provides that it is employment discrimination to fail to make
“reasonable accommodations to the known physical or mental limitations of an
otherwise qualified individual with a disability who is an applicant or
employee, unless such covered entity can demonstrate that the accommodation
would impose an undue hardship on the operation of the business . . . .” 4
Similarly, it is discrimination to deny employment opportunities to a job
applicant or employee who is otherwise qualified based on the need to make
reasonable accommodation. 5 The ADA gives examples of what might be
reasonable accommodations without providing a definition of the concept:
[Accommodations] may include (A) making existing facilities used by
employees readily accessible to and usable by individuals with disabilities; and
(B) job restructuring, part-time or modified work schedules, reassignment to a
vacant position, acquisition or modification of equipment or devices,
appropriate adjustment or modifications of examinations, training materials or
policies, the provision of qualified readers or interpreters, and other similar
6
accommodations for individuals with disabilities.

The proscriptions on employment discrimination in the ADA are subject to
a “direct threat” defense. Qualification standards may include a requirement
“that an individual shall not pose a direct threat to the health or safety of other
individuals in the workplace.” 7 This is a defense: the employer bears both the
burden of producing the evidence and the burden of persuasion. 8 The
employer’s proof may not rest on stereotypes but must provide an
individualized, objective analysis of why the individual poses risks in the
actual circumstances of the job, based on the best medical knowledge. 9

4. 42 U.S.C. § 12112(b)(5)(A) (2012).
5. Id. § 12112(b)(5)(B).
6. 42 U.S.C. § 12111(9) (2012).
7. 42 U.S.C. § 12113(b) (2012). This provision has been interpreted to cover threats to self.
Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Echazabal, 536 U.S. 73, 87 (2002).
8. EEOC v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 477 F.3d 561, 571-72 (8th Cir. 2007).
9. 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(r) (2015); see, e.g., Jarvis v. Potter, 500 F.3d 1113, 1121-22 (10th
Cir. 2007).
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Before implementation of the ADA Amendments Act (ADAAA) 10 in
2009, many plaintiffs claiming disability discrimination found their cases
dismissed because they did not meet the Supreme Court’s very stringent test
for being disabled and thus coming within the coverage of the statute. The
ADAAA reversed this trend with its rule of construction favoring “broad
coverage.” 11 Now surviving motions to dismiss or motions for summary
judgment on the question of disabilities, many plaintiffs are facing similar
motions on whether they are qualified to perform essential functions of the job
with or without accommodations. 12 This development places significant
pressures on essential job functions, reasonableness of accommodations,
analysis of undue hardship, and assessment of dangers that might be cited in a
direct threat defense. 13
In Accommodating Every Body, we, with our coauthors, argued that
accommodations should be tested by whether they were effective in enabling
the person with disabilities to perform the job in question. 14 This is the initial
showing that it is reasonable for the employee to make: that with the
accommodation, the employee would be able to do the job. The burden of
going forward would then shift to the employer to explain why the employee
could not succeed in performing the job with the suggested accommodation,
why the employee has misconstrued the essential functions of the job, or why
the accommodation would be an undue hardship. The employer might also
advance the defense that the employee poses risks to the health or safety of
others. The burden of persuasion would remain on the plaintiff to demonstrate
that the accommodation would enable her to do the job; as undue hardship and
direct threat are defenses, these burdens of persuasion would lie with the
employer.
Accommodating Every Body further explained that when reasonable
accommodations are civil rights needed to achieve equality in the face of
salient differences, they are not special benefits or privileges. 15 They enable

10. ADA Amendments Act of 2008, Pub. L. No. 110-325, 122 Stat. 3553 (2008) (codified at
42 U.S.C. §§ 12101-12213).
11. 42 U.S.C. § 12102(4)(a) (2012).
12. See Michael Ashley Stein et al., Accommodating Every Body, 81 U. CHI. L. REV. 689,
721-23, 726-28 (2014).
13. See generally Mark C. Weber, Unreasonable Accommodation and Due Hardship, 62
FLA. L. REV. 1119 (2010) (discussing accommodation requirements, the meaning of reasonable
accommodation, and undue hardship); Ani B. Satz, Disability, Vulnerability, and the Limits of
Antidiscrimination, 83 WASH. L. REV. 513, 518-19, 556, 558 (2008) (discussing accommodations
and definition of direct threat).
14. Stein et al., supra note 12, at 693 (arguing that this approach should be broadened to
apply to all work-capable individuals in need of accommodations, without the need to establish
disability identity).
15. Id. at 695-96.
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individuals to perform on the same terms as others when workplace design, job
structures, employer policies, or other features of the work environment might
otherwise have excluded them. 16 They start from the background that these
workplace features are not neutral; they bear differently on people who do not
fit paradigms of the typical or usual worker. If these differences track historical
exclusions, as they do with disability, holding them up to scrutiny is a matter
of civil rights: would proposed changes (“accommodations”) be reasonable?
Or, would proposed changes still leave the employee unable to perform the job
(unable to perform “essential functions of the job”), be too burdensome for the
employer (an “undue hardship”), or be too risky for anyone (a “direct threat”)?
Thus understood, the reasonable accommodation requirement serves the
inclusion goals of the ADA.
This accommodation requirement includes adjustment of the physical
construction of the work place: routes of access; workstations; accessibility of
bathrooms and other facilities; and parking. 17 It also includes equipment design
such as computers, telephones, or methods of intra-office communication. 18 It
requires employers to permit employees to perform tasks in non-standard
ways, so long as the performance is accomplished safely and effectively. 19 It
may require employers to adjust non-essential job responsibilities 20 or
workplace rules. 21 It may even require employers to reassign employees to
different positions, 22 but this mandate does not extend to eliminating essential
job requirements or to creating new positions. 23 Nor does it require employers
to assign employees to positions for which they are not qualified. 24
16. Id. at 696-97.
17. 42 U.S.C. § 12111(9) (2012); e.g., Feist v. La. Dep’t of Justice, Office of the Attorney
Gen., 730 F.3d 450, 453 (5th Cir. 2013) (on-site parking); Nixon-Tinkelman v. NYC Dep’t of
Health & Mental Hygiene, 434 F. App’x 17, 19-20 (2d Cir. 2011) (noting employers may also
have the obligation to assist with the employee’s commute under certain circumstances such as a
job transfer to a difficult-to-reach location).
18. E.g., Noll v. Int’l Bus. Machs. Corp., 787 F.3d 89, 92-93, 95 (2d Cir. 2015) (noting the
requirement of reasonable accommodations does not require the employer to provide
accommodations demanded by the employee, so long as the accommodations provided are
reasonable).
19. E.g., Osborne v. Baxter Healthcare Corp. 798 F.3d 1260, 1264, 1269-70 (10th Cir.
2015). In this case, a deaf applicant for a plasma center technician position at a plasmapheresis
facility proposed that she could monitor donor safety with visual rather than auditory alarms; the
appellate court reversed the district court’s grant of summary judgment for the employer on the
question of reasonable accommodations. Id.
20. Shell v. Smith, 789 F.3d 715, 721 (7th Cir. 2015).
21. U.S. Airways, Inc. v. Barnett, 535 U.S. 391, 418 (2002).
22. Smith v. Midland Brake, Inc., 180 F.3d 1154, 1161 (10th Cir. 1999).
23. E.g., Dalton v. Ctrs. for Disease Control & Prevention & Agency for Toxic Substances
& Disease Registry, 602 F. App’x 749, 755 (11th Cir. 2015).
24. Gera v. County of Schuylkill, No. 14-4789, 2015 WL 4269963, at *2 (3d Cir. July 15,
2015).
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Not surprisingly, requirements further along this list have proved
especially contentious, far more so than alterations of the physical work
environment, technology, or means of communication. Employers may
contend that non-standard methods of performance are not effective, as when a
deaf employee argues that she can use visual rather than auditory cues but the
employer questions the reliability or feasibility of the visual cues. 25 When an
employee requests adjustment of job responsibilities, the employer may
contend that the responsibilities in question are essential job functions and so
the employee is not qualified to perform the job as defined by the employer. 26
Employers may contend that otherwise neutral work rules are nondiscriminatory 27 or that it would be an undue hardship to change them,
particularly when changes in the rules would affect other employees. And
safety remains ever-present as a means to challenge whether the employee is
qualified, with the direct threat defense remaining in the background to
challenge whether the employee poses future risks. 28
The Supreme Court’s only ruling on accommodations, U.S. Airways, Inc.
v. Barnett, 29 has left a complex legacy with respect to otherwise neutral
workplace rules that may affect other employees. In Barnett, the employee
injured his back on the job as a cargo handler. 30 Unable to continue to lift as
required for a cargo handler, he transferred to a position in the mailroom. 31 A
mailroom position, however, was eventually opened to seniority-based bidding
under a seniority system voluntarily adopted by U.S. Airways; Barnett lost out
to a bid from an employee with greater seniority. 32 The seniority system was
not part of a collective bargaining agreement, and in announcing it, U.S.
Airways specified that it was not a contractual obligation. 33 Thus, U.S.
Airways could not claim undue hardship on the basis of breach of contract. 34
Nonetheless, the district court granted summary judgment for U.S. Airways,
holding that the seniority system precluded the accommodation sought by

25. Osborne v. Baxter Healthcare Corp., 798 F.3d 1260, 1272-74 (10th Cir 2015).
26. E.g., Shell v. Smith, 789 F.3d 715, 717 (7th Cir. 2015).
27. Raytheon Co. v. Hernandez, 540 U.S. 44, 51-53 (2003).
28. For example, an employee is not capable of performing essential job functions if he
makes death threats to coworkers, even though his inability to handle stress is a symptom of his
mental illness. Such an employee is not qualified and the employer does not need to provide the
individualized assessment necessary to demonstrate that the employee is a direct threat because
he poses risks of future harm. Mayo v. PCC Structurals, Inc., 795 F.3d 941, 943-45 (9th Cir.
2015).
29. U.S. Airways, Inc. v. Barnett, 535 U.S. 391 (2002).
30. Id. at 394.
31. Id.
32. Id.
33. Id. at 404, 423.
34. See Barnett, 535 U.S. at 409-10.
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Barnett. 35 The appellate court reversed, applying the standard that the presence
of the seniority system was one factor among many to be considered in
determining whether the employer could succeed with an undue hardship
defense. 36
Justice Breyer, writing for the Court, said that seniority systems normally
prevail “in the run of cases.” 37 The plaintiff, however, should be permitted to
show that special circumstances demonstrate the reasonableness of an
exception to this presumption and so the district court’s grant of summary
judgment was mistaken. 38 To argue that seniority systems are presumptively
reasonable, Justice Breyer cited the expectations of other workers created by
these systems. 39 He left open, however, the possibility that Barnett might be
able to show that the presumption did not apply because U.S. Airways had
operated its seniority system sporadically and so had not created the usual
employee expectations. 40
In reaching this result, Justice Breyer on the one hand rejected Barnett’s
argument that the only test for the reasonableness of an accommodation is its
effectiveness. 41 Instead, Justice Breyer linked the idea of effectiveness to the
accommodation itself: an alteration that does not enable the employee to do the
job would not be an “accommodation” on his view. 42 In support of linking
efficacy with accommodation, Justice Breyer first advanced the linguistic
claim that what makes something an “accommodation” is that it will work. 43
Second, Justice Breyer was concerned that on Barnett’s view the undue
hardship defense would remain, but would function as a “mirror image” of
reasonableness: the only way for an employer to argue that an accommodation
is unreasonable would be to show that it comes within the defense. 44 That is,
an employer would not be able to argue that an accommodation was
unreasonable without demonstrating that it would be an undue hardship. 45
Justice Breyer rejected this interpretation of the statute because he thought the
employer might have other reasons for finding an accommodation
unreasonable:
Yet a demand for an effective accommodation could prove unreasonable
because of its impact, not on business operations, but on fellow employees—

35.
36.
37.
38.
39.
40.
41.
42.
43.
44.
45.

Id. at 395.
Id.
Id. at 394.
Id.
Barnett, 535 U.S. at 404.
Id. at 405-06.
Id. at 399.
Id. at 400.
Id.
Barnett, 535 U.S. at 400.
Id. at 400-01.
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say, because it will lead to dismissals, relocations, or modification of employee
benefits to which an employer, looking at the matter from the perspective of
46
the business itself, may be relatively indifferent.

So Barnett would need to show something more to demonstrate
reasonableness: here, that operation of the seniority system was such that an
alteration in this case would not be disruptive to other employees.
On the other hand, Justice Breyer disagreed with U.S. Airways’ contention
that whenever a requested accommodation violates an otherwise neutral
workplace rule, it is thereby a “privilege,” a special benefit for the employee
with a disability rather than equal treatment. 47 Neutral workplace rules, Justice
Breyer emphasized, must sometimes be subject to change to create equal
opportunity. 48 Justice O’Connor, concurring, would have drawn the narrower
conclusion that seniority systems only receive special protection when they are
legally enforceable. 49 And Justice Scalia, dissenting, would have agreed with
U.S. Airways that neutral employer rules are not disability discrimination,
whether or not they concern seniority. 50
Justice Breyer’s opinion in Barnett can fairly be characterized as a
balancing act between deferring to employer rules or practices only when
changes in them would be an undue hardship and full deference to these rules
or practices unless they explicitly discriminate on the basis of disability. Much
territory lies unexplored between this Scylla of Barnett’s argument and
Charybdis of Justice Scalia’s position, however. A particularly troubling
question is when and how much of the burden of showing undue hardship will
be in practice on Justice Breyer’s analysis shifted to plaintiffs claiming
discriminatory failure to accommodate. Barnett argued that to require him to
demonstrate more than efficacy would in practice shift the burden of proving
undue hardship onto the employee. 51 Justice Breyer’s final point in support of
the identification of efficacy with accommodation rather than reasonableness
was that it would not shift the burden of proof to the employee in the way
asserted by Barnett. 52 That is, according to Justice Breyer, identifying efficacy
with accommodation would not leave the employee with burdens of
demonstrating reasonableness that ought to be for the employer to prove as
undue hardship. 53 However, if the decision in Barnett is read to extend beyond
seniority systems to hold that all neutral employer rules are reasonable in the

46.
47.
48.
49.
50.
51.
52.
53.

Id.
Id. at 398.
Id. at 397.
Barnett, 535 U.S. at 408 (O’Connor, J., concurring).
Id. at 411-18 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
Id. at 400 (majority opinion).
Id. at 401.
Id. at 402.

SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW

2015]

THE HEALTH CARE WORKFORCE

65

run of cases and only subject to challenge if the employee can show problems
with their application in the particular case, this shift in the burden of
persuasion will be exactly the result Barnett feared.
In Accommodating Every Body, we argued that efficacy should be the
touchstone for reasonable accommodations. 54 Our argument was that an
accommodation is reasonable when it enables a work-capable individual to
perform the job. 55 It was also important to our argument that apparently neutral
employer policies should be scrutinized as barriers to potentially effective
performance just as other features of workplace design should be. 56 That is, we
contended that once employees have shown that an accommodation would
enable them to do the job, it should not also be up to them to demonstrate that
apparently neutral employer policies are unreasonable. 57 It should instead be
up to the employer to show that the policies are reasonable in the sense that
changing the policies would constitute a hardship. This would put employers to
the test of defending their policies, rather than requiring employees to show
that it would be reasonable to change policies on grounds in addition to that
changes would enable them to work successfully. If Justice Breyer’s
identification of efficacy with accommodation is read to reach beyond treating
seniority as a special case, and instead to establish a presumption of
reasonableness for existing employer rules, the ADA will not achieve its full
purpose of bringing work-capable individuals into jobs for which they are
qualified. Instead, employer rules will remain set in stone unless the employer
can show an undue hardship. Moreover, as Mark Weber carefully details,
Justice Breyer’s analysis is at odds with the legislative history of the ADA,
which suggests that reasonable accommodation and undue hardship are “two
sides of the same coin,” with the duty to accommodate going up to the point at
which an undue hardship defense comes into play. 58 The undue hardship
defense, Weber argues, should be read to bar accommodations that would
function as fundamental alterations to the workplace. 59 Such an argument
could, of course, be made about a workplace that has long been governed by a

54. Stein et al., supra note 12, at 719.
55. Id. at 693, 744.
56. Id. at 698, 748-49.
57. Id. at 739.
58. Weber, supra note 13, at 1133.
59. Id. at 1138; Alexander v. Choate, 469 U.S. 287, 309 (1985) (holding that modifications
to programs such as Medicaid to enhance access for people with disabilities were not required if
they would be fundamental alterations in the program). Courts have also held that universities are
not required to make alterations to accommodate students with disabilities if these are
fundamental changes to academic programs. See, e.g., McGregor v. La. State Univ. Bd. of
Supervisors, 3 F.3d 850, 858-59 (5th Cir. 1993) (holding accommodations requested by law
student, including permission to attend classes on a part-time basis, would have required
“substantial modification” in law school program, and were not required).
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seniority system. 60 Any broader interpretation of the employee’s burden,
moreover, would appear to construe it more narrowly than the regulations,
which state that the undue hardship defense includes the impact on the ability
of other employees to perform their duties. 61 This is information in the control
of the employer rather than the employee, and thus should be part of the
employer’s defense to the employee’s claim that an accommodation would be
reasonable.
In sum, changes in employer rules and practices, just like alterations of the
physical contours of workplaces, should be considered as reasonable
accommodations. The Supreme Court’s only decision on accommodations has
left a problematic legacy about when plaintiffs must show more than efficacy
in arguing that an accommodation is reasonable and how much is left to the
employer to raise as a defense. As ADA litigation moves beyond whether
plaintiffs fit within the statutory definition of disability, courts can be expected
to face increasing numbers of cases placing at issue whether plaintiffs are
qualified to perform essential job responsibilities with or without
accommodation, as well as whether employers can succeed on undue hardship
or direct threat defenses. If entrenched employer practices and rules serve as
unalterable barriers to more inclusive workplaces, however, employee gains
from the ADAAA may prove largely illusory. In the next section, we turn to
some examples of disability discrimination litigation by health care workers
that suggest how employers’ stipulations of essential job functions can be
challenged successfully. Subsequent sections reveal how courts may be too
deferential to employers’ judgments about hardships or risks of change and too
ready to accept apparently neutral workplace policies or rules. We have
identified these cases from a search of reported decisions in the past three years
involving health care workers’ requests for reasonable accommodations. 62

60. We leave aside here the more general problem of whether the protections given to
seniority systems in employment discrimination law, e.g., 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(h) (2012) (Title VII
of the Civil Rights Act), continue to serve as problematic barriers to the civil rights of employees
who have experienced prior exclusion and so cannot benefit from these systems. See generally,
Noah D. Zatz, Special Treatment Everywhere, Special Treatment Nowhere, 95 B.U. L. REV.
1155, 1164-67 (2015); Int’l Bhd. of Teamsters v. United States, 431 U.S. 324, 325-26 (1977).
61. 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(p)(v) (2015).
62. We performed a Westlaw search of the federal cases database for (ADA & “Title I” &
accommodation & employment & (hospital or nurse or physician or “nursing home”)) & DA(aft
08-02-2012)). We also reviewed the litigation update on the EEOC website. See, OFFICE OF GEN.
COUNSEL, FACT SHEET ON RECENT EEOC LITIGATION-RELATED DEVELOPMENTS UNDER THE
AMERICANS WITH DISABILITIES ACT (INCLUDING THE ADAAA) (2015), http://www.eeoc.gov/
eeoc/litigation/selected/ada_litigation_facts.cfm. Numbers of the reported decisions involving
health care workers are too small to permit reliable statistical analysis of the data, so we present
illustrative cases only.
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III. REASONABLE ACCOMMODATIONS IN THE HEALTH CARE WORKPLACE:
EMPLOYER DEFINITIONS OF ESSENTIAL JOB RESPONSIBILITIES
Under the ADA, employees claiming discrimination must show that they
are qualified to perform essential job functions with or without
accommodations. 63 “Essential job function” is not a defined term in the ADA 64
although the statutory definition of “qualified individual” includes the
following:
For the purposes of this subchapter, consideration shall be given to the
employer's judgment as to what functions of a job are essential, and if an
employer has prepared a written description before advertising or interviewing
applicants for the job, this description shall be considered evidence of the
65
essential functions of the job.

Essential job function is defined in the regulations as “fundamental job
duties.” 66 Reasons that employers may consider in determining that a job
function is essential include that the job exists to perform that function, that a
limited number of employees are available to perform the function so that it is
difficult to redistribute, or that the function is highly specialized. 67 Evidence of
essentiality may include: the employer’s judgment about essentiality; written
job descriptions prepared before advertising the position; amount of time spent
on the job performing the function; the consequences of not requiring the job
holder to perform the function; the terms of a collective bargaining agreement;
the work experience of past holders of the job; or the current work experience
of others holding similar jobs. 68
Inclusion of the employer’s judgment about essentiality in the statutory
definition of qualified individual and in the regulations’ list of factors to be
considered invites courts to defer to employers’ determinations of job
responsibilities. 69 One study indicates that courts consider employers’
judgments and written job descriptions far more than the other factors listed in
the regulations. 70 However, if employers’ stipulations merely reflect
unchallenged assumptions about what functions jobs must include or how
these functions are to be performed, they may effectively exclude people with

63. 42 U.S.C. § 12111(8) (2012).
64. See id. § 12111(8); 42 U.S.C. § 12102 (2012).
65. 42 U.S.C. § 12111(8).
66. 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(n)(1) (2015).
67. Id. § 1630.2(n)(2)(i)-(iii).
68. Id. § 1630.2(n)(3)(i)-(vii).
69. Michael E. Olsen, Jr., Note, Disabled but Unqualified: The Essential Functions
Requirement as a Proxy for the Ideal Worker Norm, 66 HASTINGS L.J. 1485, 1498-99, 1515
(2015); Stephen F. Befort, An Empirical Examination of Case Outcomes Under the ADA
Amendments Act, 70 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 2027, 2067 (2015).
70. Olsen, supra note 69, at 1499-1500.
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disabilities who are capable of performing the job in non-standard ways.
Several recent cases involving health care workers illustrate courts’ efforts to
scrutinize employers’ claims about job responsibilities.
Consider the dispute over the job responsibilities of Kristy Sones, a home
health care nurse whose case was litigated by the Equal Employment
Opportunity Commission (EEOC). 71 Sones originally worked as a field nurse
for the LHC Group, Inc. traveling to see six to eight patients per day. 72 She
was in the process of becoming a team leader—the facts were in dispute
whether she had actually moved to the team leader position—when she had an
epileptic seizure at work. 73 Her physician cleared her to return to work, but
with driving restrictions for a year and on medications that, she claimed, left
her tired and struggling with memory. 74 She requested help in learning team
leader duties and computer skills on a timeline that would permit adjustment of
her seizure medications. 75 She also requested permission for her mother to
drive her to scheduled visits with patients on one day, which her supervisor
granted. 76 After she missed work without approval to take her child to the
doctor and a patient requested assignment of a different home health nurse,
LHC terminated Sones, stating that she was “a liability” to the company. 77
The district court granted summary judgment for LHC Group on the basis
that the EEOC had not shown that Sones was qualified for either the field
nurse or the team leader position, even with accommodations. 78 The appellate
court upheld the grant of summary judgment on the field nurse position
because driving was an essential job function; here, it considered the amount of
time employees were actually expected to spend driving and observed that the
EEOC had not produced evidence that it would be feasible for Sones to use
alternative methods of transportation with the frequency required. 79 In contrast,
the appellate court reversed summary judgment on the team leader position,
finding the EEOC had raised questions of fact about the frequency with which
team leaders were expected to see patients in the field and whether Sones
might have been able to perform occasional field visits with van or taxi
service, help from her mother, or public transportation. 80 The court’s analysis

71. EEOC v. LHC Group, Inc., 773 F.3d 688, 692 (5th Cir. 2014).
72. Id.
73. Id.
74. Id. at 693.
75. Id.
76. LHC Group, Inc., 773 F.3d at 693.
77. Id.
78. Id.
79. Id. at 698-99. It is unclear from the opinion whether the EEOC had simply failed to
produce the evidence, believing that the employer’s permission to allow Sones’ mother to drive
her to cases on one day would suffice, or whether the evidence was simply not available.
80. Id. at 699.
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is a good illustration of how courts should consider actual time spent
performing the alleged job responsibility in determining whether it is an
essential function rather than simply relying on the employer’s
representations. 81
In other cases, employers have stipulated that job responsibilities require
employees to demonstrate individual capability to perform all tasks that are the
responsibility of a workplace team. Employees with intellectual disabilities, for
example, may be able to function well when they can work in concert with
others but not if they are left to perform on their own. 82 In one successful case,
an employee with significant cognitive and physical disabilities from a cerebral
abscess and strokes argued that rotating through all functions of the
environmental services team was not an essential job responsibility. 83 The
hospital contended that all employees with his formal title of Environmental
Technician “have the same primary job description and are expected to be able
to perform all positions within the department.” 84 The employee had worked
successfully for several years as a housekeeper cleaning operating rooms;
when he was transferred to removing trash from patient rooms on several
hospital floors, he could not cope with the complexity and was fired despite his
request for reassignment to cleaning the operating rooms. 85 The district court
granted summary judgment for the hospital based on the job description. 86 In
reversing, the court of appeals stated that evidence of how jobs actually
function could rebut written job descriptions listing essential functions. 87
In another decision in which the employee contended that he could
function as part of a team, the court rejected his argument based in large part
on patient safety concerns. 88 Stern was the chief psychologist at St. Anthony’s

81. The court also concluded that the EEOC had raised an issue of fact regarding whether
LHC had engaged in required interactive process regarding Somes’ request for accommodations
to master team leader duties. LHC Group, Inc., 773 F.3d at 700.
82. E.g., Leslie P. Francis, Employment and Intellectual Disability, 8 J. GENDER RACE &
JUST. 299 (2004).
83. Mobley v. Miami Valley Hosp., 603 F. App’x 405, 406, 412, 413-14 (6th Cir. 2015).
84. Id. at 412.
85. Id. at 406-07.
86. Id. at 408.
87. Id. at 412.
88. Stern v. St. Anthony’s Health Ctr., 788 F.3d 276, 286 (7th Cir. 2015) (citing Miller v. Ill.
Dep’t of Transp., 643 F.3d 190, 198 (7th Cir. 2011), in which a bridge worker argued that it was a
reasonable accommodation for him not to have to work in exposed positions over twenty-five feet
high). The Miller court stated:
We are confident that some high work in exposed or extreme positions is an essential
function of the bridge crew as a whole. IDOT would have us take that point a step further
to find that any individual assigned to the bridge crew had to be able to perform each and
every task of the entire bridge crew. That would require finding that every task required of
the bridge crew as a whole was an essential task of each bridge crew member. On this
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Health Center and began experiencing memory loss, possibly attributable to
early stage Alzheimer’s disease. 89 The position included administrative
responsibilities, supervisory responsibilities, and clinical care; the evidence
indicated that these were all essential responsibilities of the position. 90 Stern
had requested several accommodations—reassignment of his supervisory
responsibilities, assigning him less complex cases, or putting him on part time
status—none of which he had evidence would enable him to perform essential
job functions. 91 In affirming the district court’s grant of summary judgment to
the employer, the court reasoned: “This case may be contrasted with a case
involving one member of a team of employees working at an equal level. In a
team environment, the ADA may require employers to think more flexibly
about which functions are essential and what sorts of accommodations might
be reasonable.” 92 In any psychologist position, Stern would be required to see
patients, and there were serious questions about whether he could competently
treat the complex and sometimes self-harming children who were patients at
St. Anthony’s. 93
In a case illustrating significant deference to employers’ judgments about
what job responsibilities are essential, Leokadia Bryk, a nurse in the behavioral

record, we cannot make that finding as a matter of law. Plaintiff has come forward with
substantial evidence showing that his bridge crew did not actually work that way. The
bridge crew worked as a team. No one person was assigned permanently to any one task.
Although individual members of the team did various tasks as needed, there was no
requirement that the bridge crew members rotate from task to task in an organized, routine
fashion, such that it was necessary for any one member of the bridge crew to be able to do
every task of the bridge crew as a whole.
Miller has presented evidence that, at least prior to March 23, 2006, the team
accommodated the various skills, abilities, and limitations of the individual team members
by organizing itself according to those skills, abilities, and limitations. Maurizio could not
weld, so the other members did the welding when it was required. Another co-worker
refused to ride in the snooper bucket, so those tasks, when needed, went to others. This
was also true of bridge spraying, yard mowing, and debris raking for a crew member with
allergies.
As in other “team” environments, the individual members took on tasks according to their
capacities and abilities. Here, a reasonable fact-finder would have to conclude that some
members of the bridge crew had to be able to work at heights in exposed or extreme
positions so that the bridge crew—as a unit—could do its job, just as some members of
the crew had to be able to weld, ride in the snooper bucket, spray, mow, and rake. That
conclusion does not mean that the fact-finder would be required to conclude that each
member of the bridge crew had to be able to do every task required of the entire team.
Miller, 643 F.3d at 198-99.
89. Stern, 788 F.3d at 279-80.
90. Id. at 279, 286.
91. Id. at 283-84, 289.
92. Id. at 286.
93. Id. at 294.
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health unit at St. Joseph’s Hospital, needed a cane to walk after hip surgery. 94
The accommodation she requested was use of the cane on a daily basis. 95 The
hospital refused, contending that she worked in a unit where she posed a risk of
harm from patients grabbing her cane and that the ability to subdue patients
safely was an essential element of the position; they then told her that she
would need to apply for other positions or be terminated. 96 Bryk produced
evidence that she had never been involved in a situation requiring her to
subdue patients in the three years she had worked at St. Joseph’s. 97 She also
pointed out that other implements were readily available to patients—brooms,
mops, razors, walkers, and more—and that she used a wrist strap for her cane
and was trained in safety procedures. 98 In ruling on cross motions for summary
judgment, the district court determined that subduing patients in emergencies is
an essential function for a nurse on the psychiatric unit even if the need arises
very rarely. 99 Because the EEOC had not shown that the plaintiff could have
subdued patients safely, it had not made out this part of the plaintiff’s prima
facie case. 100
Bryk’s case was decided by a district court in the Eleventh Circuit; under
Eleventh Circuit law, a safety risk analysis is part of the plaintiff’s burden in
demonstrating that she is qualified to perform essential job functions. 101 On
this approach, the direct threat defense only comes into play as a genuine
defense for the employer to prove when it is unrelated to how the employee
performs essential job functions. 102 So, for example, the employer would have
to bear the burden of persuasion if an employee could perform job functions
just as safely as anyone else but harbors a contagious disease or is likely to be
harmed by chemical exposures. With the direct threat defense, the employer
must conduct an individualized risk assessment; 103 when the employee bears
the burden of a safety analysis, all the employer needs to do is advance a
plausible reason to think there might be a risk. Decisions such as this illustrate
how employers’ stipulations about essential job functions may erect barriers
for plaintiffs who must bear the burden of persuasion that they can perform job

94. EEOC v. St. Joseph’s Hosp., Inc., No. 8:13-cv-2723-T-30TGW, 2015 WL 685766, at *1
(M.D. Fla. Feb. 18, 2015).
95. Id.
96. Id.
97. Id. at *3.
98. Id.
99. St. Joseph’s Hosp., Inc., 2015 WL 685766, at *6.
100. Id. at *5.
101. Id. at *3.
102. Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Echazabal, 536 U.S. 73, 84 (2002) (explaining that the direct
threat defense can be used to support general “qualification standards that are job-related and
consistent with business necessity”).
103. Id. at 84 n.5.
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functions safely. Patient safety also becomes a barrier in cases questioning
whether jobs can be performed in nonstandard ways, as discussed in the next
section.
IV. REASONABLE ACCOMMODATIONS IN THE HEALTH CARE WORKPLACE:
EMPLOYER JUDGMENTS ABOUT HOW JOBS ARE TO BE PERFORMED
Some of the cases we surveyed involve workers performing jobs in nonstandard ways. Typical examples are deaf employees seeking to use visual
cues or visually impaired employees seeking to use auditory cues. In the cases
described below, facts relevant to a direct threat defense are incorporated into
the plaintiffs’ burden of persuasion that the job can be performed safely with
their proposed accommodations.
Consider Kelly Osborne, who is deaf and applied to work as a plasma
center technician. 104 Biolife conditionally offered her the position, but its
human resources director, on reviewing her pre-employment physical,
determined that she could not safely perform the position because she would
not be able to hear the alarms on the plasmapheresis machine or donor calls for
help. 105 She proposed accommodations such as enhanced alerts on the
machines, call buttons for donors to use to alert her about difficulties not
registered by the machine, or a hearing oral interpreter. 106 The district court
granted summary judgment for the employer on the basis that she had not
raised an issue of fact about her ability to perform the essential functions of the
job with accommodations. 107 In reversing, the appellate court applied a threestep test drawn specifically from Barnett. 108 First, Osborne needed to show that
the accommodation seemed reasonable “ordinarily or in the run of cases.” 109
Then, the burden of going forward shifts to the employer to present evidence
of its inability to accommodate in the form of special and specific
circumstances that demonstrate undue hardship. 110 If the employer succeeds in
so doing, the employee must then come forward with evidence concerning her
individual capabilities and suggestions for accommodations; the employee “at
all times bears the ultimate burden of persuas[ion]….” 111 This case presented
what the appellate court described as “an additional legal standard” in the form
of a direct threat defense. 112 The evidence indicated significant adverse

104.
105.
106.
107.
108.
109.
110.
111.
112.

Osborne v. Baxter Healthcare Corp., 798 F.3d 1260, 1264 (10th Cir. 2015).
Id.
Id. at 1265.
Id. at 1264.
Id. at 1267-68.
Osborne, 798 F.3d at 1267.
Id.
Id. at 1268.
Id.
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reactions in 0.0004% of plasma donors. 113 The district court had concluded
that this evidence of risk established as a matter of law the plaintiff’s failure to
show that she was qualified to perform essential job functions safely. 114 The
appellate court determined that this was the wrong legal standard for the direct
threat defense—which required a showing of significant risk—and reversed the
grant of summary judgment. 115
However, the Tenth Circuit in Osborne, like the Eleventh Circuit,
incorporated evidence of safety into the plaintiff’s prima facie case. 116 On
remand, Osborne needed to show that the accommodations she proposed—
visual alarms coupled with donor call buttons—did not pose significant risks in
comparison to other ways of performing the job. 117 It would then be the
employer’s burden of production to bring evidence that these accommodations
were an undue hardship or a significant risk. 118 Crucially, the appellate court
left the burden of persuasion on all these points to the plaintiff, including the
showing of risk. 119 Like Bryk, Osborne was unable to take advantage of the
burden shifting or the individualized risk assessment required for the direct
threat defense. 120
Or consider Reynolds, an art therapist with vision and hearing impairments
at a substance abuse and psychiatric treatment facility. 121 Reynolds’ hearing
was corrected to normal levels, but her vision only allowed her to see at twenty
inches or less and to recognize faces at twenty feet. 122 One of her duties was to
ensure a safe therapeutic environment, including monitoring patient behavior
and recording observations accurately, duties the employer claimed were
essential in a facility where patients were sometimes suicidal or violent. 123 The
facility used a check board to record observations of patients. 124 Reynolds
requested an accommodation for the board to be made bold or grayscale so that
she could see patient names and link them properly to check boxes; the board
was not modified, however, and Reynolds was ultimately discharged because
of inaccuracies in recording information and complaints by co-workers about

113. Id. at 1275.
114. Osborne, 798 F.3d at 1265.
115. Id. at 1269.
116. Id. at 1276.
117. Id. at 1278.
118. Id. at 1273.
119. Osborne, 798 F.3d at 1269-70.
120. Id. at 1269.
121. Reynolds v. Butler Hosp., No. 13–cv–10117–DJC, 2015 WL 2083334, at *1 (D. Mass.
May 4, 2015).
122. Id.
123. Id. at *1, *6.
124. Id. at *6.
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her responsiveness to patients. 125 The hospital moved for summary judgment,
contending that Reynolds was not qualified to perform essential job
functions. 126 All agreed that she had the necessary training and skills to
perform the job, but the employer claimed that because of her sensory
impairments she could not do so safely. 127 Like the Osborne court, the court in
Reynolds included demonstration of the ability to perform the job safely as part
of the plaintiff’s prima facie case. 128 Although the court concluded that she had
raised sufficient issues of material fact about her level of vision, the frequency
with which she misidentified patients and staff members, and the reasons for
her errors with the check board to survive summary judgment, it cautioned that
she would need to meet a difficult level of proof at trial: “[A]t trial, Reynolds
must show not only that she is capable of performing the essential functions of
the job, but also that she can do so without endangering the safety of
others.” 129
Cases such as Reynolds illustrate how courts may incorporate concerns for
patient safety into the plaintiff’s burden of persuasion—and how this approach
may confront work-capable individuals with employer stereotypes about what
constitute safe methods of performance. The more inclusive alternative is to
place the burdens of proof on the employer to show that the employee’s
proposed method will put patients at risk—surely an important consideration,
but one that should not isolate employer assumptions about performance
methods from scrutiny.
V. REASONABLE ACCOMMODATIONS IN THE HEALTH CARE WORKPLACE:
EXAMINING NEUTRAL EMPLOYER RULES
As described above, Barnett has left a conundrum about its generalization:
does its ruling reach beyond seniority systems to all neutral workplace rules,
assuming them to be reasonable in the run of cases? 130 Several cases illustrate
how presumptions in favor of supposedly neutral rules might preclude
challenges to conventional barriers to inclusion.
A frequent problem for employees who are ill or injured is the need for
time off work to undergo treatment and hopefully recover. Contract leave or
Family Medical Leave Act (FMLA) leave, although helpful, may expire before
the employee is able to return to work, subjecting the employee to the risk of

125.
126.
127.
128.
129.
130.

Id. at *3-4, *10.
Reynolds, 2015 WL 2083334, at *4.
Id. at *4-5.
Id. at *4.
Id. at *9-10.
U.S. Airways, Inc. v. Barnett, 535 U.S. 391, 394 (2002).
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discharge for unexcused absences. 131 Many cases hold that requests for
indefinite leaves of absence without any idea of when the employee may be
able to return to work are not reasonable accommodations. 132 Employers,
however, may have rules that provide for discharge once leaves have run out,
even when employees can set a date certain for their return. Employers may
have these rules because it is difficult or expensive for them to hold positions
open or because leaving a position unfilled may place burdens on other
employees. In such cases, however, employers should be required to prove that
the leave would be an undue hardship, rather than simply asserting adoption of
the discharge rule. Depending on staffing structures, it might not be at all
difficult for employers to accommodate employees with needs for extended
time off.
Consider Catherine LaFlamme, a nurse at Rumford Hospital. 133 After a
back injury made it difficult for her to work, she requested a reduced schedule,
FMLA leave, a medical leave of absence for surgery, and then transfer to per
diem status (on which the employee is part of a pool that can be called into
work for shifts when needed by the hospital but is also free to decline these
requests). 134 The hospital had a rule of taking people off their per diem list if
they had not worked in six months 135—a neutral rule. While on per diem
status, LaFlamme kept the hospital regularly informed about her condition and
desire to return to work; although she updated them that she would be cleared
to work by mid-January, she was taken off the list in mid-December after the
six months had expired. 136 Her requested accommodation was extension of the
per diem employee termination rule; the hospital’s argument was that a request
to hold a position open indefinitely is not a reasonable accommodation. 137
The First Circuit standard is that plaintiffs must propose accommodations that
are reasonable on their face. 138 In refusing summary judgment, the court
concluded that LaFlamme had raised triable issues of fact on whether the leave
she had requested was indefinite and on whether the short extension she

131. E.g., McDonald v. SEIU Health Care Pa., No. 1:13-CV-2555 2014 WL 4672493, at *17
(M.D. Pa. Sept. 18, 2014).
132. Id. at *9; see, e.g., Samper v. Providence St. Vincent Med. Ctr., 675 F.3d 1233 (9th Cir.
2012) (holding regular attendance was an essential function of the job after employee was denied
an accommodation request for an unspecified number of unplanned absences and an exemption
from the employer’s attendance policy).
133. LaFlamme v. Rumford Hosp., No. 2:13-CV-460-JDL 2015 WL 4139478, at *3 (D. Me.
July 9, 2015).
134. Id. at *4, *6, *20.
135. Id. at *7.
136. Id. at *9.
137. Id. at *13.
138. LaFlamme, No. 2:13-CV-460-JDL 2015 WL 4139478, at *13.
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requested would be an undue hardship for the hospital. 139 Notably, no
questions of patient safety or inconvenience to others were raised in this case;
all that was at stake was a request to be kept on the per diem list beyond the
sixth-month period. 140
Cases involving neutral rules about attendance policies tend to be far more
favorable to employers. For example, Forrester, a diabetic, requested to be able
to come in late on mornings when she was having difficulty managing her
blood sugar. 141 Her employer maintained that they had tried to work with her
to accommodate her needs but that “it would constitute a severe hardship on
operations if we could not predict [her] arrival times within a reasonable
degree of certainty.” 142 The court agreed with the employer and granted
summary judgment: “[T]o require an employer to accept an open-ended ‘work
when able’ schedule for a time-sensitive job would stretch ‘reasonable
accommodation’ to absurd proportions.” 143 The case was a complex mixedmotives case in which the employer advanced a number of reasons for firing
Forrester. 144 However, at no point did the court suggest that exploring a more
flexible work schedule might have been a reasonable accommodation unless
the employer could show it was an undue hardship. Instead, the court accepted
the employer’s representation that its attendance policies were reasonable. 145
Forrester’s position was operations management, so there would have been no
direct effects on patient care from her irregular hours. 146
VI. ADDRESSING THE PIPELINE: ACCOMMODATION IN TRAINING AND TESTING
Challenges to workplace barriers will be of limited avail if qualified
workers with disabilities cannot be found to fill positions. Yet data indicate
that although the number of students identified with disabilities is growing in
higher education generally (to 11 percent in 2011-2012) and in graduate
programs (to 7.6 percent in 2010), providers with disabilities remain low in
comparison to disability percentages in the population overall. 147 One
discussion reports research under way at the University of California, San

139. Id. at *14.
140. Id. at *8.
141. Forrester v. Prison Health Servs., No. 12-CV-363 2015 WL 1469737, at *2 (E.D.N.Y.
Mar. 30, 2015).
142. Id. at *24.
143. Id.
144. Id. at *13.
145. Id. at *24.
146. See also McClelland v. Permanente Med. Grp., Inc., No. 2:11-CV-1224-LKK-EFB 2013
WL 1195032, at *9 (E.D. Cal. Mar. 22, 2013) (open-ended scheduling not a reasonable
accommodation).
147. Lisa M. Meeks et al., Support students with disabilities in medicine and health care
programs, DISABILITY COMPLIANCE FOR HIGHER EDUC., Oct. 2015, at 1.
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Francisco (UCSF) School of Medicine attempting to determine actual numbers
of qualified applicants and medical students with disabilities in the U.S.148 This
discussion also underlines the need for study of creative accommodation
solutions that eliminate barriers, maintain technical standards, and do not put
patient safety in question. 149 To address this knowledge gap, Stanford
University and UCSF have appointed researchers to pursue evidence-based
research of best accommodation practices. 150 The extent to which the law has
kept pace is, however, uneven—as we have seen with respect to employment
and as we will explain in this section with respect to education, training, and
examinations.
One of the initial and formative cases involving disability accommodations
in education concerned an applicant with disabilities to a nursing education
program. Even at the time it was decided—1979—the case rested on highly
questionable assumptions about the plaintiff’s capabilities and standards for
accommodations, but continues to cast a shadow today.
The case was Southeastern Community College v. Davis, the first case in
which the Court interpreted the Rehabilitation Act. 151 Davis was denied
admission to Southeastern’s nursing program based on their conclusions that
her hearing impairment made it impossible for her to participate safely in the
training program or to function safely as a nurse. 152 She brought suit under the
Rehabilitation Act section 504 prohibition of discrimination against an
“otherwise qualified handicapped individual” in federally funded programs
solely by reason of disability. 153 The evidence indicated that her hearing was
correctable to the extent that she could detect sounds but for fully accurate
communication would need to look directly at the speaker in order to
supplement with lip reading. 154 The trial court, in entering judgment in favor of
Southeastern, found that in circumstances such as an operating room
physicians and nurses wear masks, making lip reading impossible; also, nurses
might need to respond immediately to verbal cues that Davis would be unable
to see because of her positioning or the positioning of others. 155 So the trial
court drew the conclusion that Davis was not “otherwise qualified” and
Southeastern was not required to accommodate her. 156 The appellate court took
a different view of the assessment of qualifications, holding that she should be

148. Id.
149. Id. at 5.
150. Id.
151. Se. Cmty. Coll. v. Davis, 442 U.S. 397, 405 (1979).
152. Id. at 401-02.
153. 29 U.S.C. § 794(a) (2012). This language was later amended, substituting “otherwise
qualified handicapped individual” for “otherwise qualified individual with a disability.” Id.
154. Davis, 442 U.S. at 401.
155. Id. at 403.
156. Id. at 404.
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assessed on the basis of her academic and technical qualifications, leaving her
disability aside. 157 If she met these qualification standards, Southeastern should
then be required to accommodate her. 158
On appeal, the Supreme Court interpreted the statutory language “solely by
reason” of disability to mean that her disability alone could not be the reason
for denying Davis admission to the nursing program. 159 Rather, Southeastern
could consider her capabilities with the disability in determining whether she
was qualified for the program—that is, Southeastern could consider whether
she was qualified in spite of her disability, not whether she was qualified
except for her disability. 160 The Court then noted that it was “undisputed” that
the current constitution of Southeastern’s program would not permit Davis to
function safely for patients in clinical components. 161 Davis contended that she
could function safely with modifications to the program and auxiliary aids and
services. 162 The modifications she proposed were individual supervision when
directly attending patients and elimination of certain required courses; this last
accommodation would leave her qualified to perform some, but not all, of the
tasks registered nurses are licensed to perform and allow her to take some but
not all nursing positions. 163 Characterizing these suggested accommodations
pejoratively as “affirmative action,” the Court said that they would be a
“fundamental alteration” and interpreting the statute to require them would go
far beyond the statutory requirement of non-discrimination in federally funded
programs. 164 As a non-discrimination requirement, section 504 of the
Rehabilitation Act requires “evenhanded treatment” not “affirmative efforts to
overcome the disabilities caused by handicaps.” 165
Our argument in Accommodating Every Body agrees in one critical respect
with the Davis interpretation of the Rehabilitation Act and its progeny the
ADA: as non-discrimination statutes, these statutes consider whether
accommodations can enable persons with disabilities to perform required job
tasks capably. 166 Accommodations are required (leaving defenses aside) if they
will allow people with disabilities to perform jobs on a par with others. Where

157. Id.
158. Id.
159. Davis, 442 U.S. at 405.
160. Id. at 406.
161. Id. at 409, 413.
162. Id. 407-09.
163. Id.
164. Davis, 442 U.S. at 409-10.
165. Id. at 410 (contrasting between section 504 and other sections of the Rehabilitation Act
that did require such affirmative efforts to meet the special needs of people with disabilities).
166. See Stein et al., supra note 12, at 710-19 (discussing gap between work capability and
accommodation).
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we part company with Davis lies in its uncritical acceptance of Southeastern’s
judgments about Davis’s capabilities or the tasks required of nurses.
In one respect, the destructive effect of Davis was soon cabined by a
second critical Rehabilitation Act decision, Alexander v. Choate. 167 This case
addressed Tennessee’s decision to cut Medicaid costs by limiting the number
of hospital days per year for patients. 168 When patients brought suit claiming
that this program was disability discrimination because the limitations were
more burdensome for people with disabilities, the Supreme Court stated that
the test was whether people with disabilities had “meaningful access” to the
benefit in question. 169 It “struck a balance” between the statutory meaningful
access requirement and legitimate interests in the integrity of the institutions’
programs. 170 Although the Court concluded that the Alexander plaintiffs had
not shown that they were denied meaningful access, the meaningful access
standard has proved a fruitful source for plaintiffs contending that public
services are not effectively available for them. 171 Only when the requested
modification is a fundamental alteration are otherwise qualified plaintiffs
denied changes that would give them meaningful access to public programs.
Indeed, practices in educating health care professionals have evolved far
beyond the assumptions made by the Southeastern College’s nursing faculty.
To take one example, the School of Medicine at the University of California at
Davis (UC Davis) has used technology in a surgery rotation for a medical
student with profound hearing impairments. 172 The technology is tablet
technology that links the sounds in the operating room to an off-site
transcriptionist and projects the transcript onto a monitor in the operating
room. 173 UC Davis described the technology as creating “a level playing field”
that enabled the student to participate actively in the surgery, assisting just like
other medical students are able to do. 174
To take another example, Tim Cordes, who is blind, successfully
completed the medical scientist training program (M.D., Ph.D.) at the

167. Alexander v. Choate, 469 U.S. 287 (1985).
168. Id. at 289-90.
169. Id. at 301.
170. Id. at 300; Palmer Coll. of Chiropractic v. Davenport Civil Rights Comm’n, 850 N.W.2d
326, 337 (Iowa 2015).
171. See generally Leslie P. Francis & Anita Silvers, Debilitating Alexander v. Choate:
“Meaningful Access” to Health Care for People with Disabilities, 35 FORDHAM URB. L. J. 447
(2008).
172. Technology assures deaf student learns surgery at UC Davis School of Medicine, UC
DAVIS SCH. OF MED., http://www.ucdmc.ucdavis.edu/medschool/features/2011-2012/01/2011120
7_som_deaf_student.html (last visited Nov. 18, 2015).
173. Id.
174. Id.
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University of Wisconsin Medical School. 175 He completed visual portions of
the program by using touch and computer programs that converted images into
structures that can be felt. 176 His accommodations included books on tape and
in Braille, a computer that could download and convert text to speech at high
speeds, and a computer that enabled him to make raised line drawings to
interpret images via touch. 177 Although the medical school was originally
doubtful, concerned that the Association of Medical Colleges would be
concerned about a medical student who could not see, he gradually won
everyone over and completed all the tasks of other medical students. 178 Cordes
is now a practicing board-certified psychiatrist at the VA Hospital in Madison,
specializing in treating patients with post-traumatic stress disorder (PTSD) and
addictions. 179
David Hartman is another blind physician and was a role model for
Cordes—the first blind graduate of a U.S. medical school, Temple University
in 1976. 180 Hartman practices psychiatry in Roanoke, Virginia, specializing in
addictions, and is board certified in psychiatry. 181
There are also blind physicians practicing rehabilitation medicine. Stanley
K. Yarnell, a graduate of Ohio State University Medical School and board
certified in physical medicine and rehabilitation, recently retired as the medical
director of rehabilitation medicine at St. Mary’s Medical Center in San
Francisco. 182 Stanley Wainapel, graduate of Boston University, is currently
chief of the Department of Physical Medicine & Rehabilitation at Albert
Einstein College of Medicine. 183 In family practice, Spencer Lewis continued
to practice medicine, with an expanding practice, after becoming blind. 184

175. Todd Finkelmeyer, Tim Cordes one of few sightless doctors in U.S., THE CAPITAL TIMES
(June 2, 2010), http://host.madison.com/ct/news/local/health_med_fit/tim-cordes-one-of-fewsightless-doctors-in-us/article_2699c69d-668f-5eea-9410-6f7f29b0befa.html.
176. Id.
177. Id.
178. Id.
179. Tom Cramer, Blind Doc at VA Sees Patients Differently, U.S. DEP’T VETERANS AFF.
(June 13, 2013), www.va.gov/health/NewsFeatures/2013/June/Blind-Doc-at-VA-Sees-PatientsDifferently.asp.
180. Ramona Walhof, The Blind in Medical Professions, FUTURE REFLECTIONS (July-Sept.
1985), https://nfb.org/images/nfb/publications/fr/fr04/issue3/f040303.html.
181. See generally id. (providing a more general discussion of blindness and medical
professions). See generally DAVID HARTMAN & BERNARD ASBELL, WHITE COAT, WHITE CANE:
THE EXTRAORDINARY ODYSSEY OF A BLIND PHYSICIAN (1978).
182. Emily Smith Beitiks, DVP Interview: Emily Smith Beitiks and Stanley K. Yarnell,
DISABILITY VISIBILITY PROJECT (October 23, 2014), http://disabilityvisibilityproject.com/2015/
02/10/dvp-interview-emily-smith-beitiks-and-stanley-k-yarnell.
183. Faculty Profile: Stanley F. Wainapel, M.D., ALBERT EINSTEIN C. MED., http://www.ein
stein.yu.edu/faculty/3657/stanley-wainapel/ (last visited Oct. 17, 2015).
184. Walhof, supra note 180.
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Eventually, his hospital privileges, withdrawn after he lost his sight, were
restored, except for permission to deliver babies. 185 He continued home birth
and clinic deliveries, however. 186 In 1981, Dr. Lewis helped to organize the
American Society of Handicapped Physicians, which by 1985 had more than
1,000 members. 187 This organization evolved into the Society of Physicians
with Disabilities, now a sub-group of the Society of Healthcare Professionals
with Disabilities that includes physicians, pharmacists, nurses, and students
preparing for these professions. 188
These examples are not isolated cases, moreover. Beyond the empirical
research at UCSF and Stanford, one recent study reports a survey of fifty-six
deaf or hearing-impaired physicians or trainees (twenty-five practicing
physicians and thirty-one trainees) in the U.S. 189 Accommodations included
modified stethoscopes, auditory equipment, notetaking, Communication
Access Realtime Translation (CART), signed interpretation, and oral
interpretation. 190 Most respondents reported satisfaction with their
accommodations from educators and employees, although there were frequent
needs to spend time arranging the accommodations. 191 Interestingly, modified
surgical masks were used infrequently although these are available and would
permit speech visualization. 192 These physicians reported strong interests in
primary care and in treatment of deaf patients, suggesting important
advantages for the care of such patients who are frequently underserved, such
as language and hearing concordance or understanding of communicative
challenges of patients. 193 A report from Canada indicates that models for
success in the United States are becoming influential in Canadian medical
education, with impressive gains for diversity in patient care. 194
Actual numbers of students with disabilities in medical schools remain
low, however. A recent survey of U.S. and Canadian medical schools indicated
that about a half a percent of students had physical or sensory disabilities and
the most common accommodations were extra time on exams, accessible

185. Id.
186. Id.
187. Karen Gallegos, Disabled Doctors Convene for Mutual Moral Support, L.A. TIMES
(June 7, 1985), http://articles.latimes.com/1985-06-07/local/me-16068_1_disabled-doctors.
188. SOC’Y PHYSICIANS WITH DISABILITIES, http://www.physicianswithdisabilities.org/p/a
bout-us.html, (last visited Oct. 17, 2015).
189. Christopher J. Moreland et al., Deafness Among Physicians and Trainees: A National
Survey, 88 ACAD. MED. 224, 226 (2013).
190. Id. at 227.
191. Id. at 231.
192. Id. at 227.
193. Id. at 230.
194. Cathy Gulli, Diversity Among Doctors: Students with disabilities are finding their place
in medical schools—and beyond, MACLEAN’S, Sept. 28, 2015, at 48.
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access, and audio recording of lectures. 195 The most common impairments
were hearing difficulties, low vision, spinal cord injury, and brain injury. 196
This study concludes that “people with [physical or sensory disabilities] are
grossly underrepresented in U.S. medical schools, and their access . . . may not
have improved during the last 30 years.” 197 The study attributes this stasis to
the Association of American Medical Colleges’ failure to update technical
standards for medical students and technical standards at participating schools,
together with medical schools’ inexperience with accommodations and lack of
knowledge of new technological possibilities. 198 The data in the study also
suggest an unusually high attrition rate for students with disabilities who are
admitted to medical schools; possible explanations are difficulties in obtaining
accommodations, attitudinal barriers, or inability to demonstrate requisite
competencies—as well as more realistic understanding of the demands of
medicine. 199
Judicial deference to professional judgments about qualification risks leave
existing practices intact without the careful scrutiny needed to see whether they
are necessary for professional competence or patient safety. While some
decisions have insisted on careful, individual evaluation of capacities with
accommodation, others remain highly deferential to existing assumptions about
performance. Deference is especially likely in cases involving challenges to
examinations.
One successful recent decision involved a hearing-impaired medical
student at Creighton University who sought to use CART technology during
his clinical rotations. 200 During his first two years at Creighton, Argenyi had
paid personally over $100,000 for the technology, but the medical school
refused to allow him to continue to use it, claiming that the auxiliary aids they
offered were sufficient. 201 The trial court initially granted summary judgment
for Creighton on the basis that Argenyi had not shown his requested
accommodations were “necessary” and that Creighton had provided “effective
communication.” 202 The appellate court reversed, determining that Argenyi
had raised issues of fact whether Creighton had provided him with auxiliary
aids and services that would give him “an equal opportunity to gain the same

195. Sarah M. Eickmeyer et al., North American Medical Schools’ Experience With and
Approaches to the Needs of Students With Physical and Sensory Disabilities, 87 ACAD. MED.
567, 569-70 (2012).
196. Id.
197. Id. at 567.
198. Id. at 568.
199. Id. at 571.
200. Argenyi v. Creighton Univ., 703 F.3d 441, 445 (8th Cir. 2013).
201. Id.
202. Id. at 445-46.
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benefit from medical school as his nondisabled peers” 203—citing Alexander v.
Choate’s meaningful access standard. On remand, a jury verdict found
Creighton had discriminated but not willfully so; Argenyi received the aids he
requested but not restitution for his prior expenses for CART. 204
Another recent decision concerned a visually impaired student at Palmer
College of Chiropractic. 205 Aaron Cannon requested the accommodation of a
sighted assistant to help him with the visual parts of the program (e.g., reading
radiographs). 206 Palmer contended that the accommodation would be a
fundamental alteration in the program as Cannon would not be performing the
tasks himself. 207 The College claimed that Cannon was not qualified because
its technical standards included a certain level of visual proficiency—a level
they claimed was required by the standards of the Council on Chiropractic
Education, their national accrediting body. 208 Although blind students in the
past had graduated successfully from Palmer, the standards had been adopted
after their graduation. 209 The Davenport Civil Rights Commission decided in
favor of Cannon: Palmer’s California campus waived vision-specific technical
standards to accord with California civil rights law and Palmer presented no
evidence that waiver had jeopardized their accreditation. 210 The district court
decided that the Commission had failed as a matter of law to grant appropriate
deference to Palmer’s judgments about curricular requirements. 211 The Iowa
Supreme Court reinstated the order of the Commission, invoking the
Rehabilitation Act regulations that state that a qualified individual is one who
“meets the academic and technical standards requisite to admission or
participation” 212 in the educational program and citing Alexander v. Choate for
the requirement to set a balance between meaningful access and fundamental
alteration. 213 The Iowa court summarized two guiding principles for
fundamental alteration analysis: deference to the institution’s professional or
academic judgment and institutional obligations to seek out suitable means of
accommodation together will provide a factual record of conscientiously

203. Id. at 451.
204. Argenyi v. Creighton Univ., No. 8:09CV341, 2014 WL 1838980, at *2, (D. Neb. May 8,
2014).
205. Palmer Coll. of Chiropractic v. Davenport Civil Rights Comm’n, 850 N.W.2d 326, 328
(Iowa 2014).
206. Id. at 330.
207. Id.
208. Id. at 352.
209. Id.
210. Palmer Coll., 850 N.W.2d at 332, 345.
211. Id. at 332.
212. 34 C.F.R. § 104.3(l)(3) (2015).
213. Palmer Coll., 850 N.W.2d at 337.
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carrying out this obligation. 214 Institutions cannot simply rely on accepted
academic norms, as new alternatives may be available; this is critical to assure
that academic claims are not disguised forms of disability discrimination. 215
Palmer had failed to meet the requirement of in depth individual analysis and
so deference to its judgments was not appropriate. 216
Other decisions have deferred to academic judgments refusing to allow
accommodations in which students are provided with performance aids. For
example, Emily McCulley was admitted to the University of Kansas Medical
School but the program rescinded her admission after they determined that her
spinal muscular atrophy meant that she could not meet their technical standard
for physical performance. 217 The accommodation she requested was help with
lifting patients but the school determined that she would need to perform
procedures such as resuscitation that were beyond her physical capacities. 218
Noting that in “academic matters, we often defer in substantial part to the
professional judgment of educational institutions,” the court of appeals upheld
summary judgment for the medical school. 219 McCully had no way to rebut the
argument that providing a staff surrogate would render her an observer rather
than a participant; the clinical procedures that she sought surrogates for were
part of the U.S. Medical Licensure Exam that she would need to pass. 220 Thus
her request would be a fundamental alteration of the medical school
curriculum. 221
Cases involving licensure examinations or board certification illustrate
similar deference to professional judgments. For example, Roland Saavedra
was dismissed from the residency program at the University of Wisconsin after
he failed to pass Step 3 of the licensure exam. 222 Saavedra had dyslexia,
ADHD, and learning disabilities and required extra time on examinations. 223
However, he took the Step 3 exam twice without requesting accommodations;
after two failures, he was granted an unpaid leave of absence to study for the
exam and a final date within which to pass the exam. 224 Although he submitted
the requisite information for accommodations, he met with delays in receiving

214. Id.
215. Id. at 338.
216. Id. at 341.
217. McCulley v. Univ. of Kan. Sch. of Med., 591 F. App’x 648, 650 (10th Cir. 2014).
218. Id. at 649-50.
219. Id. at 651.
220. Id.
221. Id.
222. Saavedra v. Bd. of Regents of the Univ. of Wis. Sys., 982 F. Supp. 2d 879, 881-82 (E.D.
Wis. 2013).
223. Id. at 881.
224. Id.
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them and was unable to take the exam within the specified time period. 225
After receiving the accommodations and passing the Step 3 exam at the next
available scheduled time, he applied for reinstatement but was told that the
program lacked the resources to accommodate the approximately six month
delay. 226 The court, in ruling for the program, determined that the issue of
accommodations was between Saavedra and the licensing board, not the
program, and that Saavedra was at fault for not having passed the examination
within the required time frame. 227 This analysis left unexamined Wisconsin’s
rule about the time within which residents must pass—an otherwise neutral
rule that should be questioned unless changing it is an undue hardship for the
program—and places the blame on the person with disabilities for not having
requested accommodations early enough in his time in the program.
Or consider Chad Cunningham, a medical student with Irlen syndrome, a
condition that causes severe headaches with prolonged reading and is
aggravated by bright lights. 228 He completed the first two years of medical
school, passing all of his coursework. 229 However, the test conditions for Step
1 of the licensing exam caused him severe headaches and he failed the exam
twice narrowly, taking it without accommodations. 230 He requested
accommodations before the second attempt, but they were denied based on
preliminary review, with the board determining that Cunningham had not
received accommodations in the past and needed to provide “extensive and
voluminous” records to substantiate his disability—a request that could not be
met before the next scheduled exam. 231 University of New Mexico Medical
School rules required Cunningham to take a leave of absence without working
and to pass the exam within three tries and complete medical school within six
years—requirements he could not meet given the schedule of the licensing
exam. 232 Cunningham’s requests to the University for accommodations and for
help with his accommodation request to the licensing board were also without
avail. 233 Cunningham’s lawsuit was also unsuccessful: his claims against the
licensing board were not ripe, because he had only received a preliminary not a
final denial of his accommodation request. 234 His claims against the medical
school failed: like Saavedra’s, Cunningham’s problems were with the board,
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not his medical school. 235 And his medical school’s rules about the time within
which students needed to pass the Step 1 examination and complete medical
school were reasonable; changes in the program would be a fundamental
alteration. 236 In reaching this last conclusion, the court quoted language from
other cases stating that “[e]ducational institutions are accorded deference with
regard to the level of competency needed for an academic degree.” 237 In this
case as well, practices of the licensing board combined with apparently
neutral—but not carefully scrutinized—time limitation rules to erect a barrier
to a student with disabilities in demonstrating his capacity to perform
competently as a physician.
The case of David Rawdin brings into sharpest focus the incongruity
between competent performance and licensing examinations. 238 Rawdin had a
cognitive impairment as a result of surgeries for a brain tumor that affected
memory retrieval in abstract contexts. 239 He requested accommodations for the
physician licensing exams, which he eventually passed. 240 He successfully
completed a pediatric residency and “flourished” at the Children’s Hospital of
Philadelphia—treating over 10,000 babies and exhibiting by all accounts
“exemplary” performance. 241 However, his position required board
certification within five years and Rawdin met with persistent failure on the
multiple-choice portion of the board certification exam. 242 Rawdin requested
accommodations in the form of an alternative examination structure. 243 The
American Board of Pediatrics (ABP) refused, saying that it would be far too
difficult to construct an alternative examination and that the existing
examination did not require Rawdin to remember facts out of context. 244 The
trial court’s verdict in favor of the ABP was upheld on appeal. 245 Rawdin was
not able to find a hospital that would grant him privileges without board
certification 246 and he currently practices as a certified mohel in
Philadelphia. 247 At the trial court, the ABP represented that it has an
accommodations program with the goal of providing equal access but not equal
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outcomes or unfair advantages; accommodations are not available if they are
fundamental alterations of the certification program. 248 The trial court found
both that Rawdin was not disabled as he was not substantially impaired in the
major life activity of test taking (even though he couldn’t pass the ABP exam
he was a better test taker than the average member of the population) and that
he was not entitled to the accommodation he requested. 249 In reaching that last
conclusion, the court said that just as educational institutions are granted
deference about the requirements for academic degrees, “so too should ABP be
granted deference regarding accommodations that would devalue
certification.” 250 To be sure, board certification is a measure of qualifications,
but in this case deference to professional judgments coupled with institutional
rules requiring board certification barred someone from practicing specialty
medicine who had demonstrated capability in practice.
In conclusion, progress towards inclusion in medical training remains
uneven. Although reports and anecdotal cases illustrate how creative use of
technology especially may enable people with disabilities to function capably
in training and practice, rules such as time-to-completion requirements remain
barriers that have not been put to the full scrutiny required by undue hardship
or direct threat defenses.
VII. CONCLUSION
The cases we have discussed illustrate courts grappling with complex
issues about accommodating employees with disabilities in the health care
workplace or in the training of health care professionals. In these cases,
employers’ contentions about essential job responsibilities, methods of
performance, or workplace rules are accepted too frequently without careful
scrutiny. Allegations of risks or hardship may be left to plaintiffs to disprove as
part of their initial showing and employers will not be pressed to justify
decisions to continue business as usual. The result in practice may be ongoing
exclusion of capable employees with disabilities from health care workplaces.
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